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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the challenges that climate change raises for animal agriculture and discusses 
the contributions that may come from a virtue ethics based approach. Two scenarios of the future 
role of animals in farming are set forth and discussed in terms of their ethical implications. The paper 
argues that when trying to tackle both climate and animal welfare issues in farming, proposals which 
call for a reorientation of our ethics and technology, must first and foremost consider the values that 
drive current livestock production. This paper sets forth and discusses the broader societal values 
implicit in livestock production. We suggest that a virtues approach would improve our thinking and 
practice regarding animal agriculture, facilitating a move from livestock production to animal hus-
bandry. This change in animal agriculture in a time of climate change would stress virtues such as 
attentiveness, responsibility, competence and responsiveness as central elements in any mitigation or 
adaptation program.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The global climate is changing. It is getting warmer and more extreme weather events will become 
more frequent. This means that the living conditions for plants, animals and humans will change 
profoundly over the next 50-100 years.1  
 
The societal debate concerning climate change indicates that there is more than just the correct inter-
pretation of scientific data at stake. Not only are scientific and technical issues eagerly discussed, but 
also societal, political and ethical issues related to climate change are being debated by scholars, 
policy-makers, industry agents and laypersons alike. Climate change obviously raises a number of 
technical issues: How quickly can we produce cars with lower petrol consumption? How effectively 
can we construct improved dyke embankments to protect against flooding? How soon can we devel-
op solar cell technology to a level where it becomes economically competitive? However, climate 
change also raises issues which cannot be answered solely from a scientific or technological point of 
view. Although there seems to be an agreement that both adaptation and mitigation2 are necessary 
strategies, there is little agreement on what values should guide us in shaping these strategies, and 
how we should prioritise between the different problems and challenges. Hence, a core line of rea-
soning in this paper is the argument that ethical and political questions need to be discussed before 
we can move on to scientific and technological solutions.  
                                                 
1 This can be observed and has been confirmed numerous times. Within the scientific community, there is a 
large degree of agreement that these changes are largely caused by human emissions of green house gases, 
especially carbon dioxide and methane (IPCC 2007, Richardson et al. 2009). These issues are still debated 
though, and the scientific discussion is still reverberating, especially regarding the causal effects of climate 
change. This discussion has had severe political implications, as the political decisions about the adequate 
human response to climate change have been tightly linked to climate research. For more on the influence of 
climate research on the political discussions, and the influence of political discussions of climate change on 
climate research see Heymann et al. (2009) and Meyer and Lund (2009). In this article, however, we have 
chosen to follow the most commonly held views among climate scientists and lean on the reports from the 
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007), and the synthesis report from the climate change confer-
ence in Copenhagen (Richardson et al. 2009). We do not discuss whether climate change is real, or what its 
possible causes might be. Rather we take the assertion that anthropogenic climate change is a serious problem 
as our point of departure, and move on from there. For a brief overview of the latest discussions of the credibil-
ity of the IPCC reports please see Borenstein (2010). 
2 “Mitigation” is the commonly used term for strategies that seek to decrease the human impact on greenhouse 
gas levels, e.g. switching from fossil fuels to alternative energy sources such as wind and sun. “Adaptation” is 
the commonly used term for the human activities that seek to change societal structures to be ready for the 
expected climatic conditions in the future, e.g. enhancing dykes above the current need to prepare for future 
rises in sea levels. 
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In the UN's International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)  Assessment Report 4 from 2007, animal 
agriculture3 is regarded as one area that raises a huge range of ethical issues in relation to climate and 
increasing temperatures (Parry et al. 2007). While ethical issues such as social justice, land use, ani-
mal welfare, and food safety, are already discussed in relation to industrialised farming, the revela-
tion that around 15 % of the total anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions stems from animal agri-
culture (Steinfeld et al. 2006, FAO 2009), makes it necessary to revisit these discussions in light of 
climate change4. The urgency of discussing what values should underlie our food production sys-
tems, and especially the global animal production system, is stressed by the dire consequences that 
are associated with continued uncontrolled emissions:  
 
“The scientific evidence today overwhelmingly indicates that allowing the emission of greenhouse 
gases from human activities to continue unchecked constitutes a significant threat to the well-being 
and continued development of contemporary society. The knowledge that human activities are influ-
encing the climate gives contemporary society the responsibility to act. It necessitates redefinition of 
humanity’s relationship with the Earth and - for the sake of the well-being of society – it requires 
management of those human activities that interfere with the climate.” (Richardson et al. 2009: 7) 
 
To examine the ethical values at stake when considering how to change animal agriculture, we put 
forth two possible scenarios and evaluate them from three different ethical perspectives: a utilitarian 
perspective, an animal rights perspective and an ethics of nature perspective. We then proceed to 
consider both future scenarios from an environmental virtue ethics point of view.  Here, we norma-
tively argue that only by attending to the root concerns will we be able to respond adequately to is-
sues such as justice, responsibility and compassion. These issues are in turn necessary for developing 
                                                 
3 Animal agriculture can have many shapes. In this paper we distinguish between livestock production under-
stood as the intensive, conventional, industrialised production of meat, milk, eggs and other animal products, 
and animal husbandry understood as producing animal products with an emphasis on sustainability and the 
virtue ethics approach discussed later in the paper. 
4 The number published in the Steinfield report from 2006 has come under recent criticism from Pitesky et al. 
(2010).  The Steinfeld report postulates that around 18% of the collective green house gas emissions can be 
blamed on animal agriculture. However, Pitesky et al. conclude that the methods used to calculate the contribu-
tion of animal agriculture and the transportation sector differ too much from each other to be comparable, and 
that the impact of animal agriculture is lower than has been estimated. On the other hand, Goodland and An-
hang (2009) estimate through life cycle analysis that more than 50% of the total green house gas emissions can 
be linked to animal agriculture. In this paper, we conservatively estimate 15 %, and maintain that such a num-
ber warrants our serious attention in a situation where mitigation and adaptation strategies are needed for all 
areas which contribute significantly to anthropogenic climate change. 
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best strategies for animal husbandry in the wake of looming weather extremes. We further point out 
that part of our ethical responsibility is to make transparent and discuss the broader societal visions 
and values embedded in our decisions about food and our relationship with the environment.  
 
In many instances where ethicists have chimed in to respond to climate change in relation to food 
production, the central issue has been food security; namely, how to produce food for an ever grow-
ing number of human beings on less arable land under worsening climatic conditions (Garvey 2008). 
However, a theme that is often overlooked is the one that concerns the moral shape of our agricul-
ture.  Little concentrated attention has been given to what we eat and how we produce it, as a reflec-
tion of the state of our lives in general discussions of agriculture and ethics (notable exceptions in-
clude Berry 1996 and 2009; Thompson 2008 and 2001; Singer and Mason, 2006), but the theme is 
remarkably non-existent within the debate of agriculture and climate change. Furthermore, it is im-
portant not to let the threat of climate change supersede all other discussions of agriculture and eth-
ics. For instance, the welfare problems for billions of animals caused by the efficiency of production 
systems (Foer 2009) are still important ethical issues which will not disappear because of climate 
change. Rather, the solutions to the huge contribution of animal agriculture to green house gas emis-
sions should be also seen from an animal welfare perspective – at least if animal welfare is an ethi-
cally significant moral consideration, as it appears to be for the public at large in recent decades. 
 
As we see it, traditional ethical responses to animal welfare issues, most notably, utilitarianism and 
deontology or rights-based ethics, are insufficient to provide adequate solutions to the moral ques-
tions raised by climate change and animal agriculture – or indeed the welfare problems caused by 
industrialised livestock production. Boldly put, a major concern here is that these responses are for-
mulated as answers to a set of questions which is too narrow with ‘one size fits all’ solutions, where-
as animal welfare issues evoked by climate change should be discussed within a broader context.  
The intersection between animal welfare ethics and climate ethics is complicated by general globali-
sation issues, such as trade and North-South equity, and the fact that food production is also about 
food security, food safety, individual and population health, and cultural and religious identity and 
tradition. Thus, given the nature of the animal issue as it relates to climate change, a broadening of 
the perspective is needed. This perspective requires an inclusive approach and calls for individual 
responsibility based on recognising our interconnectedness with others in the food system. 
 
2. HUMAN-ANIMAL-CLIMATE: A MORAL RELATION 
 
 5
As history will attest to, the West or ‘the developed world’ has been tempted to first approach any 
new question with a technological answer. The industrialisation of agriculture that grew out of con-
cerns for food security after World War 2, was a result of government and industry policies that 
sought to transform existing infrastructure that employed mechanised and automated technologies to 
produce abundant and cheap food (Sandoe & Christiansen, 2008).  Today, we have inherited a sys-
tem of agriculture that relies on science to reduce costs, and to cultivate uniform agricultural com-
modities and bend the will of the non-human world to meet human interests for food.  This is equally 
applicable to livestock production. Animal agriculture is, in many ways, merely another industry or 
enterprise rife with technical and scientific practices and methods with narrow human-centric goals 
(Foer 2009). Science and technology have been marshalled to inquire and solve problems related to 
the wholesale aspects of farming; problems such as the optimal feed for the animals, optimal housing 
conditions and adequate levels of veterinary care that don't break the bank.  However, if we adopt a 
'business as usual' mentality and immediately decide that we can only solve the challenges ahead by 
using technologies such as biotechnological breeding tools or intensive high-tech production sys-
tems, we ignore the ethical values associated with animal welfare in general, and we fail to realise 
that the human-animal-climate-relation cannot be merely relegated to an industry – at least not with-
out a convincing ethical argument that animals are no more than resources to be used. Since we don’t 
share such a view, we find it important to maintain that the human-animal relation is a moral one that 
can provide us with the motivation to rethink our approach to animal agriculture in the light of the 
challenges of climate change. To think and act adequately in the current situation in the context of 
animal production thus requires us to re-think the basic assumptions about our relationship with na-
ture and animals (Wolf and Gjerris 2009, Röcklinsberg 2009).  
 
We take the perspective that ethics is not something you are done with at some point, but it is a con-
tinuous effort to illuminate the moral terrain and to understand our basic values in light of our current 
challenges (Gjerris 2009). An important part of ethical reflection is clarifying the concepts used 
when discussing complex matters. Concepts such as “organic” and “sustainability” are widespread 
and often carry positive connotations, but they are seldom very clear. To avoid unnecessary misun-
derstandings, the following is our interpretation of these concepts in this article: Organic farming is a 
system of food production that relies on sustainable practices such as cyclic systems and social 
awareness. Organic foods differ from conventional agricultural products in terms of how they are 
grown or raised. With respect to the former, synthetic chemicals, antibiotics, hormones, and genetic 
engineering are avoided in farming for food consumption. Furthermore, organic farmers seek to cre-
ate an agro-food-ecosystem which is capable of feeding the world and that works with nature to 
grow without toxins or chemical fertilisers (Badgley et al. 2006). However,  critics of this alternative 
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form of farming have argued that it is unfeasible to feed the world without using toxins, synthetic 
chemicals or genetically modified organisms, and that doing so on an organic platform will actually 
take up more land, be more labour intensive and will produce less compared to conventional systems 
(Badgley and Perfecto, 2007). 
 
Sustainability is a moral idea that involves equity over time and reflects both intra-generational and 
inter-generational obligations to the larger human community, and to the nonhuman world.  The 
sustainable model(s) on which we settle will involve particular normative commitments to promote 
the ability of our agro-food system to continue functioning into the indefinite future, without being 
forced into decline through depletion of central resources. It will undoubtedly incorporate two key 
approaches, namely, resource sufficiency or functional integrity. Briefly, the former refers to the 
capacity to adapt or respond to depletion of the central resources mentioned above, while the latter 
emphasises the capacity of systems to reproduce or rejuvenate over time (Thompson and Nardone, 
1999).  
 
But before the actual (more or less sustainable) scenarios are considered, a further description of the 
role of animal husbandry in a time of climate change is needed. 
 
 
3. CHALLENGES TO ANIMAL HUSBANDRY IN A TIME OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE 
Some of the more important consequences of the climate changes that the IPCC (2007) predicts in-
clude more extreme weather types, rising sea levels, changes in temperature and climate leading to 
changed living conditions for wildlife and plants and human communities (especially indigenous 
peoples in rural areas). These scenarios imply changing conditions for agriculture, increased pressure 
on fresh water infrastructure and increased problems with invasive species. All these challenges 
mean that there will be increased pressure on the Earth´s ability to sustain human life as we know it 
today. Drastic changes in lifestyle and culture seem to lie ahead. One particular place where (radical) 
adjustments will need to occur is in farming, including animal agriculture.  
 
In January 2009, Rajendra Pachauri, chair of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, IPCC, himself a vegetarian, fuelled the climate debate by stating that reduced meat con-
sumption would be as necessary as reduced transports to reduce green house gas emissions, since 
meat production itself is responsible for about 20% of global greenhouse gas emissions (Steinfeld et 
al. 2006, FAO 2009 – see note 4). Moreover, food security, as well as food safety, will be issues of 
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increased importance due to future climate change. According to the Food and Agriculture Organisa-
tion of the United Nations: 
 
“Rural communities, particularly those living in already fragile environments, face an immediate and 
ever-growing risk of increased crop failure, loss of livestock, and reduced availability of marine, 
aquaculture and forest products.” (FAO, 2009: 1) 
 
According to the report, about one third of the total greenhouse gas emissions can be traced back to 
the agricultural and forestry sectors and essential solutions must be found in these areas, not least 
since they are closely related to land use. Furthermore, food products of animal origin have a greater 
impact on the climate than vegetables (livestock constitute nearly 80% of all emissions from agricul-
ture (FAO 2007: 112). About 70 % of the world’s agricultural land is used for livestock production, 
including grazing and crops for feed (Steinfeld et al. 2006). Increased sustainability in systems for 
land and manure management as well as water use are needed to mitigate aspects of climate change 
and adapt to new demands on global food security. Hence, land and farming management practices 
need to be established that mitigate negative climate change. On a theoretical level, an effective and 
quick solution would be to refrain from all animal production, and use land for vegetables with a 
low(er) level of greenhouse gas emissions. The reduction, or even termination, of land use for animal 
production would furthermore release large areas for more sustainable forms of land use or for GHG 
sinks, such as wildlife refuges and national parks. There are many good arguments for adopting a 
vegetarian/vegan diet that we cannot go into here. As a personal choice, it is one of the most obvious 
to make in this connection and to promote politically. It is, however, in our view, not very realistic 
that the global population will adopt such a strategy. We have therefore chosen not to use this as a 
scenario in this article. 
 
A more realistic stance, in our view, would be to assume that animals will continue to be used in 
farming, thus raising the question of how and to what extent this should be done, if we are to take the 
challenge of climate change seriously. For one thing, it follows that we are still left with the perenni-
al question of how to ensure the welfare of the animals – and to what degree we are obligated to do 
so (Röcklinsberg 2009). We will consider the role of animals in farming with two possible scenarios, 
which we will examine  whilst we will also consider the shortcomings of traditional ethical argumen-
tation in philosophical animal ethics in a time of climate change. The scenarios we've chosen further 
serve the goal of highlighting the complexity of ethical issues related to climate change, and our call 
for a more inclusive approach to ethical thinking. These are not the only two possible scenarios. As 
mentioned, one could imagine the global adoption of a vegetarian or vegan diet as a strategy. We 
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have, however, limited ourselves to the consideration of the two strategies that we believe to be the 
most likely in the foreseeable future. 
 
4. POSSIBLE ROLES OF ANIMALS IN FUTURE FARMING SYSTEMS: 
TWO SCENARIOS 
 
In this section, we will briefly discuss two possible scenarios for adapting animal agriculture to cli-
mate change, and address the ethical considerations that would arise and that would need to be con-
sidered. Linked to the FAO’s suggested new practices for mitigating global warming (FAO 2009), 
the following scenarios are such that a society concerned with climate change could decide to follow 
them in an attempt to lower green house gas emissions from animal agriculture. Hence, through the 
scenarios we present two different interpretations of what might characterise the responsible and 
sustainable management of farmed animals, and we evaluate them from three of the main ethical 
perspectives in the climate change discussion: A utilitarian perspective, an animal rights perspective 
and an ethics of nature perspective. 
 
Scenario 1: Increased intensity  
The first scenario takes its point of departure in the FAO statement that: 
 
“By far the largest shares of emissions come from more extensive systems, where poor livestock 
holders often extract marginal livelihoods from dwindling resources and lack the funds to invest in 
change. Change is a matter of priority and vision, of making short-term expenses (for compensation 
or creation of alternatives) for long term benefits.” (FAO 2007: 114) 
 
We currently farm and slaughter approximately 56 billion terrestrial animals every year at the global 
level (FAO, n.d.) and the FAO projects that worldwide demand for farm animal production will dou-
ble by 2050 (FAO 2006, p. 275). Within this scenario we will simply assume that this is an inevitable 
development, and the task of animal agriculture is therefore to figure out ways to maintain a reliable 
source of food from animal products, while at the same time reducing green house gas emissions. 
Intensification, the mode of food production that aims at increasing agricultural yield per unit input, 
is regarded as being the only way to decrease emissions if production is not only to be maintained, 
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but doubled. At the same time, it will be necessary to do this while relying on sustainable land man-
agement practices that do not deplete resources such as soil and water.5  
 
A simple way to reduce green house gas emissions would be to reconsider what species of animals to 
farm. It is well known that methane gas from ruminants constitutes a large part of total methane 
emissions, and one option would be to radically reduce ruminant livestock and instead increase the 
production of broilers, fish and other aquaculture products (Cederberg et al., 2009; Sonesson et al. 
2009; Winther et al. 2009). Although aquaculture and fisheries are widely threatened by climate 
change in some geographical areas, intensification in other areas and land based fish production 
could be further developed to provide a greater share of the world’s demand for animal protein.  
 
What would such a scenario mean for animal welfare, and more generally, for animal ethics? Intensi-
fication does not necessarily imply lower welfare for each single animal. In reality however, it does 
very often entail exactly that. According to Foer (2009), higher livestock density, as well as efforts to 
reduce costs and increase yields per animal are hard to combine with the welfare interests of individ-
ual animals. A utilitarian response is well suited to underpin such a production system: theoretically, 
by reducing our reliance on large ruminants as our source of animal protein, an overall positive out-
come can be achieved on an environmental level by exploiting lower emission producing aquaculture 
and broilers. Limiting the number of ruminants would ostensibly lead to more land for crop produc-
tion, a reduction in overgrazing and alternative land management options to reduce global food inse-
curity (FAO 2006). From a utilitarian perspective, these advantages, combined with the advantage of 
fulfilling the human desire for animal products, would then have to be weighed against the animal 
welfare problems that the further intensification of animal production would cause – as well as the 
environmental problems that would still be present, albeit on a smaller scale than if the growth in 
production had been with other animal species. 
 
From a utilitarian perspective, interests related to the minimisation of suffering are given equal con-
sideration. Thus, even the staunchest animal welfare utilitarian would contend that in cases of acute 
food scarcity, the human need for food should trump an animal's interest regarding, for example, a 
certain cage size or the freedom to move in less crowded waters, all things considered. While both 
interests are regarded as basic, the human interest in alleviating hunger or starvation is, on balance, 
                                                 
5 Whether this is at all possible is an open question that we will not discuss here. As the interest lies in the 
ethical evaluation of the hypothetical scenario, for the sake of argument we simply assume that this is possible 
(although in reality the claim initially seems rather flawed (Steinfeld 2006). 
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more urgent. In a normal situation, however, well known adherents to utilitarian ethics6 argue that 
basic human needs for food can be met without consuming animal products, as a vegetarian/vegan 
diet can provide the necessary ingredients for a healthy life. This, however, has to be weighed 
against the human interest in eating animal products. As to the increase in the quality of life that this 
might afford humans compared with the loss in life quality due to the welfare problems of animals, 
there is no easy answer. Different people will evaluate this differently. So, even though the utilitarian 
Peter Singer recommends vegetarianism as the correct utilitarian approach (Singer 1993), there is no 
doubt that many others would conclude that the enjoyment they get from consuming animal products 
justifies at least some degree of animal suffering. 
 
A further positive aspect of intensive aquaculture and broiler production, as seen from a utilitarian 
perspective, would be the increased number of animals. Assuming that these animals would have 
more positive than negative experiences, the sheer fact that they are alive adds to the overall positive 
result. This is especially true since there will be a greater number of poultry and fish than ruminants. 
Moreover, even if a number of the animals concerned have a low welfare, the overall positive out-
come would outweigh their negative experiences7. 
  
From another ethical standpoint however, it would be difficult to accept increased intensity in broiler 
and fish farming based solely on cost-benefit analyses. Adherents to the view that Sandøe and Chris-
tiansen (2008) call “respect for nature” would argue that the possibilities for individual animals to 
perform species-specific behaviour would be too restricted in e.g., an intensive fish industry that 
curtails 'natural' movement over lengthy distances (Lund et al., 2007), and that this would not be 
balanced by the mere aggregated affective experience. Furthermore, the whole notion of ‘respecting 
nature’ in this sense would go against using animals as a resource to fulfil human desires, even if the 
welfare of the animals were taken into consideration. It is simply not the right attitude to show to-
wards something that you have a relationship with that moves beyond the limited notion of consump-
tion or interests. 
 
                                                 
6 Peter Singer is the most well-known utilitarian defender of respect for animal preferences. Animal Liberation, 
2nd edn. Thorsons, London. 
7 Derek Parfit discusses this seemingly inevitable conclusion in Reasons and Persons from 1984 in relation to 
human welfare. He calls it the repugnant conclusion – a name that obviously can also be used when applying 
the same logic to animals. 
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A related argument against intensive livestock production of any kind is given by animal rights theo-
ries, i.e. deontological animal ethics8, which argues that each animal should be respected in itself, as 
it has intrinsic value. According to this view, commercial animal agriculture ought to be abolished 
since, contra to animal welfare utilitarianism, any farming that aims at using animals (i.e. ‘subjects-
of-a-life’) for the sake of human preferences in this way is regarded as being the unjustified instru-
mentalisation of individuals.  
 
To the aforementioned it can be added that the increase in efficiency of animal production since 
World War 2 has been made possible, to a large degree, by systematic breeding strategies, (Sandøe 
and Gamborg 2008; Harrison 1964). The developments within biotechnology e.g., genomics, trans-
genics and cloning, could further these developments (Robl et al. 2007; Niemann et al. 2005), thus 
increasing the efficiency of the animals in the light of the contribution of the animal species to cli-
mate change. Basically, even more feed-efficient animals would contribute to reducing the total 
emissions, although the total climate footprint of the feed would still need to be considered (Sones-
son, 2009). One can also envisage reduced methane emissions from cattle, just as Canadian research-
ers have developed a pig that can reduce the emissions of phosphorous into the environment from 
intensive pig farming (Forsberg et al. 2003). Thus, animals could have “double roles” e.g. serving 
both as bioreactors, for the production of human proteins (Hunter et al. 2005, Röcklinsberg 2009) 
and meat for consumption, and as genetically modified organisms which can lower the energy input 
in other ways.  
 
From a utilitarian perspective, animal welfare and climate proponents could have their cake and eat it 
too. While protecting the overall welfare of sentient beings efficient ways of farming through the 
careful selection of species/breeds dovetails nicely with the aim of doing right by the environment. 
In a situation in which the climate is getting warmer, and in which each animal contributes to global 
warming by its mere existence, it becomes necessary to find the most prudent way of using animals, 
without compromising too much of their welfare.  
 
Intrinsically, environmentalism and animal welfare need not collide under a ‘respect for nature’ 
view.  However, advocates of this approach would have difficulty accepting certain ways of breeding 
animals, especially if the techniques employed transgress ethical borders of naturalness and integrity 
i.e., certain modern molecular biotechnologies. An animal rights view would also see this sort of 
                                                 
8 Tom Regan is the most well known animal rights proponent. See Regan's The Case for Animal Rights. Uni-
versity of California Press, 1983, Los Angeles. A recent analysis of Animal Rights Theories can be found in 
Karlsson, 2009. 
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manipulation of animals as potentially problematic if the modification only serves human interests.  
Designing animals for human purposes without also promoting animal interests smacks of instru-
mentalisation, and a gross disregard for the ethical value of the animals themselves (Gjerris et al. 
2009). 
 
It is interesting to note that the goal of the strategy: To cut down on the emissions of green house 
gases from animal production, would only be indirectly relevant seen from the utilitarian and the 
animal rights perspective. Only to the extent that climate change might harm sentient beings more 
than it benefits them, or to the extent that climate change violates the perceived rights of any subject-
of-a-life, would these two perspectives find climate change problematic. The respect for nature per-
spective would, on the other hand, find the idea of anthropogenic climate change ethically objection-
able in itself, as it would be seen as an expression of a skewed relationship between humans, animals 
and the rest of nature. 
 
Scenario 2: Organic farming 
According to the second scenario, the best way to mitigate the negative impacts of climate change on 
food supply is the global conversion of all farmland to organic farming (Edwards 2009, IFOAM 
2009b). This scenario would lead to a reduction in meat and dairy production, necessitating dietary 
changes in countries with high meat consumption, as the current level of animal production would 
need to be reduced to meet the goal of reducing green house gas emissions. One of the main reasons 
for this is that the close links between organic farming and extensive, welfare-oriented animal pro-
duction would prohibit the intensification otherwise possible within conventional animal production. 
In the longer run, however, it might be the case that organic animal production would continue, 
whereas the intensified system would break down due to its unsustainable nature leading to even 
lower production rates. According to the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Pro-
gram (UNEP), “Organic Agriculture can be more conducive to food security than most conventional 
systems, and…it is more likely to be sustainable in the long term.” (IFOAM 2009a: 18). Organic 
farming has a higher resilience to changes in temperature, water supply and other factors of envi-
ronmental stress thanks to, among other things, recycling systems and higher biodiversity (Badgley 
et al. 2006; Niggli et al. 2007; IFOAM 2009a and2009c). Furthermoreustainable thinking in organic 
farming could include e.g. (closed) cyclic systems which build on the use of the farm’s own re-
sources, and biodiversity and a high number of different species interacting on the farm for farm 
sustainability and higher soil fertility (Fliessbach and Mäder, 2006; Granstedt and Kjellenberg 2008). 
Animal production would need to be adjusted to land capacity, since organic farm animals are kept 
outdoors to a large extent. The ability to perform species specific behaviour reduces stress levels, 
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enables positive experiences, and allows them to contribute to farm management (e.g. pigs preparing 
fields) and biodiversity (e.g. on grazing land by keeping chickens and ruminants together) (Lund and 
Röcklinsberg 2001).  Over and above the positive environmental effects, organic farming is closely 
linked to a range of values such as ecology, human and animal health, fairness and care 
(www.ifoam.org, Padel et al. 2007).  
 
One central ethical rationale behind organic farming (IFOAM 2010) is a commitment to sustainabil-
ity in two dimensions: environmental and social (including animals in the social sphere). The domes-
tication of animals for human use prima facie obligates us to respect their innate behavioural needs 
with regard to environment, feed, social and sexual behaviour and affective experiences (Lund et al., 
2004; Lund and Olsson 2006). This view of sustainability, encompassing social justice, both in the 
human sphere and between humans and animals through an 'implicit contract with animals,' and ob-
servances of a Leopoldian style wise use 'Land Ethic' found in organic farming, can be traced back to 
pastoral and agrarian relations with the nonhuman world (Anthony, 2009). These latter ethics cele-
brate the integral role animals play in the development of human moral character and food security. 
These commitments to sustainability reflect an Aristotelian respect for the essence or telos of ani-
mals, which is seen as being essential for their development (Rollin 1995). In line with this, Martha 
Nussbaum elaborates a capabilities approach to animal ethics, which considers animals as having 
basic entitlements, for example, being entitled to fair treatment and a dignified existence commensu-
rate with their evolutionarily inherited adaptations or capacities (Nussbaum 2007). Showing this kind 
of respect by promoting species-specific behaviour patterns, coupled with a strict reduction in pro-
duction animals adjusted to land capacity are key features of organic animal farming. Organic farm-
ing thus seems to be a good mitigation/adaptation strategy towards the goals of sustainable, animal 
welfare-friendly farming, as long as one can accept the decline in consumption of animal protein that 
will follow. 
 
From a utilitarian perspective, the evaluation of this scenario will rest on some of the same assump-
tions as when evaluating the first scenario. Initially, the trade-off seems to be that we obtain higher 
welfare per animal in the second scenario, albeit with a lower number of animals. This should be 
weighed against the possible welfare loss for (some) humans as a result of dietary changes involving 
reduced animal protein. To make the picture more complex, one could throw in the potential health 
gains, both on an individual and societal level, derived from a “greener” diet, just as the pollution 
from animal production could be reduced thereby increasing human welfare. As with the first scenar-
io, the utilitarian evaluation will rest on a series of assumptions concerning consequences that are 
difficult to get clear answers to. Overall however, we presume that most utilitarians would find the 
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organic farming scenario preferable, since it does not exclude meat consumption, but only reduces it, 
thus meeting some human desires, while also protecting the welfare of animals to a higher extent 
than in the first scenario. 
 
From an animal rights perspective, the second scenario represents an improvement on the first as 
animal welfare increases. However, from an animal rights perspective this actually misses the main 
point. The real problem with animal production is not the welfare issue, although this is important 
enough in itself. As Tom Regan says:   
“The fundamental moral wrong here is not that animals are kept in stressful close confinement or in 
isolation, or that their pain and suffering, their needs and preferences are ignored or discounted. All 
these are wrong, of course, but they are not the fundamental wrong. They are symptoms and effects 
of the deeper, systematic wrong that allows these animals to be viewed and treated as lacking inde-
pendent value, as resources for us -- as, indeed, a renewable resource.” 
Regan 1983, 113 
From a respect for nature perspective, the second scenario is much preferred to the first. Attempting 
to adapt production systems to the species-specific behaviour of animals and seeking to embed ani-
mal production in organic farming practices which a regard for ecological carrying capacity, resource 
use etc. will be evaluated as positive. As for the argument that animal production uses up land that 
could otherwise be left for wild animals so that they could unfold their lives, there are two possible 
answers. Some will assert that the human task is to step as lightly on the ground as possible, which 
would include adapting to a diet that puts as little strain on the planet´s resources as possible, whilst 
others would assert that the task is for humans to embed themselves in systems of farming that mim-
ic natural processes as much as possible. Advocates of the first position would prefer scenario 2 to 
scenario 1, although similar to advocates of the animal rights perspective, they would consider the 
best solution to be to halt all animal production. Advocates of the other position would find the or-
ganic scenario preferable both to scenario 1 and to an abolitionist perspective (we will return to this 
in the next section).  
Again, it is worth noting that of the three perspectives, the only one which regards climate change as 
being more than just a side effect to take into consideration is the respect for nature perspective. 
From our point of view, this signifies that the utilitarian and animal rights perspective, discussed in 
relation to the scenarios, do not offer tools for an inclusive approach to the issue (animal production 
in a time of climate change), but rather a certain focus on interests or rights, i.e. they handle a very 
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specific part of the human-animal-relation in the light of climate change without actually seeing the 
whole problem: Climate change and animal welfare are closely intertwined. While calling for an 
interconnection and intertwining of ethical aspects and perspectives, a further advantage of the vir-
tues approach is its focus on individual responsibility for one’s own personal way of living. The core 
question becomes: ‘What kind of person do I want to be in relation to animals in a world of climate 
change?’ This calls for individuals to reflect on their ethical position and choices, which moves be-
yond balancing interests or focusing on rights.  
 
In the following, we will suggest an approach which facilitates the consideration of our relationship 
with technology and nature, and provides useful tools when considering the human-animal-climate 
change issue. This inclusive virtue ethics approach can thus be seen as being based on considerations 
of more organic forms of farming, sustainability and respect for nature, as outlined above. 
 
 
5. VIRTUE AND VICE IN ANIMAL FARMING 
As portrayed and discussed above, the problem of climate change, as it relates to food and animal 
welfare, is complex, fluid, and multi-dimensional. It challenges nations around the globe to respond 
with a strategic and long-term approach. The complexity of the problem is compounded by a persis-
tent and pervasive view of ‘harm to others’ found in most developed countries, that is, concerted 
moral action related to climate change and the plight of farmed animals suffers from the problem of 
remoteness. In both cases, the subjects of harm are anonymous and often physically and emotionally 
distant from the consuming public. The kind of harm induced by our collective action is seemingly 
amorphous, i.e., unintentional, since there are layers of social, economic and political barriers that 
obscure the discharge of duties of justice and compassion. Given the complexity associated with how 
harm is conceived here, it is hard to see how we might be responsible for mitigating harm directly for 
either future generations of people or farmed animals. Consumers and producers of animal products 
certainly have a large collective ecological footprint when it comes to products of animal origin.  
How might we think about personal responsibility given the nature of animal production and climate 
change? 
 
Thinking in terms of virtues can provide a solid basis for recontexualising our relationship with ani-
mals in fruitful ways. In the case of our relationship to agriculture, a virtues perspective can help us 
to discern agriculture's role in forming both personal character and global citizenship, and provide 
the basis for evaluating policies and transforming technologies. Systems of intensification, for exam-
ple, would be justified only if they reinforce our role as stewards of the land and animals. 
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As indicated above, the standard ways of critiquing the anthropocentrism inherent in industrialised 
animal production systems typically employ categories from deontological ethics or consequential-
ism. From our perspective, these approaches are not enough to deal adequately with the welfare of 
farmed animals, because they only offer band-aid solutions to symptomatic issues and side step the 
root causes: We need to change our attitudes and actions and the moral shape of our institutions and 
how they are governed. Only by attending to the root concerns will we be able to respond effectively 
to the issues of justice and compassion punctuated by climate change.  
 
Furthermore, it seems fair to say that even a reduction in the consumption of animal products, to be 
realistic, would need to be seen as a gain and not a sacrifice. The idea that people living in affluence 
today would surrender a life that they envisage as being “good” to accommodate the needs of future 
generations living in other locations seems naive. Without entering a long discussion on human na-
ture, it seems more likely that profound changes in what we eat will need to be based on new visions 
of what constitutes the good life (Gjerris 2010). In other words, the collective 'we' i.e., individual 
citizens, both as citizens and in their social roles as consumers, governments and industry agents, 
producers etc. need to reconsider ideals and virtues if there is to be a change in the consumption of 
animal products. Otherwise the only realistic scenario will be scenario 1. 
 
Environmental virtue ethics, with its central evaluative concept of excellence of character, as has 
been discussed lately (see for example, Newton 2003; Sandler and Cafaro 2005), is a promising way 
of thinking in relation to the question of animal welfare and climate change. It advocates focusing on 
living well and cultivating character traits that contribute to the development of human beings and 
the nonhuman world alike. An important tenet of this ethic involves taking ownership for choices 
that we make, especially in the face of relationships that involve vulnerable or dependent others. 
Under this view, the self is bound to other living beings both personally and through the various in-
stitutions that formalise and facilitate life. We are necessarily embedded within human and biotic 
communities with an eye to personal responsibility in choices about food. As a consequence, a vir-
tues approach offers both a critical revision of the view of harm mentioned above, and a reorientation 
of our relationship to the planet (see Sandler and Cafaro 2005). 
 
A virtues approach, as it relates to animals, stresses the role of animals, the climate and the biotic 
community in the formation of moral character or dispositions to act. It would invoke a critical shift 
from ‘livestock production’ to a more robust ‘animal husbandry’. Environmental (and in this case 
agricultural) virtues are proper dispositions or character traits for human beings to have regarding 
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their interactions and relationships with agriculture, farmed animals and food for that matter. The 
virtuous person, in this case, is disposed to respond to farmed animals in an empathic and responsi-
ble way, and to resist the reductionism of sentient beings into mere commodities or mere relative 
goods. Virtue ethics is not only oriented towards ensuring that human communities flourish, but 
nonhuman ones as well.  It holds promise as a viable ethic here since it has the resources to tackle the 
fundamental question concerning, 'how should we live well with others'? According to Sandler in 
Character and Environment: A Virtue-Oriented Approach to Environmental Ethics (2007), a central 
advantage of the language of virtue and vice is its richness and depth in confronting the complexity 
and diversity of the relationships we have with the natural and built environments relative to, for 
example, the languages of deontological ethics or consequentialism. A virtue ethics approach does 
not appeal to a ‘one size fits all’ solution. Rather, it also implies a pluralistic response to challenges 
involving domesticated species in a time of climate crisis. Here, different virtues may be called on in 
different contexts, some of which will be presented below.   
 
Virtue ethics and agriculture in a time of climate change: How should we proceed? 
In a traditional account of virtue, a good person strikes a mean position between tendencies of excess 
and deficiency, and aims towards equilibrium after reflecting on and bringing to bear all the relevant 
facts in light of the desire to be good at being human. An agricultural virtues approach would chal-
lenge individual consumer-citizens to pose the following question, "How should I act to create and 
maintain a sustainable, humane and just food system in the wake of climate change?"   
 
In the case of climate change and animal ethics, we would like to propose four key elements as an 
adequate point of departure for developing a framework to respond to the intersection between ani-
mal ethics and food related climate change. They include (adapted from Simone Weil's (1977) work 
on "attentive love" (see also Anthony 2009): 
• Attentiveness,  which involves being mindful and cognisant of the realities of modern food 
production and paying heed to the plight of animals and how our actions influence their wel-
fare and the capacity of those who care for them (see also Foer 2009). 
• Responsibility, which involves acting in ways that minimise the deleterious impacts of our 
behaviour on others (in this case, domesticated animals) from whom  we benefit, and on the 
planet as such. Sandler, for example, offers other virtues such as humility and stewardship 
that challenge existing normative relationships with the nonhuman world. 
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• Competence, which involves developing certain dispositions and taking the step from 
knowledge to acknowledgement. E.g. acknowledging the plight of farmed animals and the 
interplay between farming and pollution and other climate related impacts, so that we may 
make good choices when the time comes to act, e.g. relating the reality of intensive animal 
production with the meat on our plates.  
• Responsiveness, which involves vigilance of the dependency and vulnerability of those in 
our charge, including farmed animals, the land and sea, and acting accordingly to rectify def-
icits and to promote more Earth conscious and animal welfare friendly consumption and die-
tary habits. 
 
How do these virtues help to reconsider the human-animal-relationship in the current situation of 
climate change?  Briefly, these virtues remind us that some of the basic realities of modern animal 
agriculture unfairly expose animals and those who produce them to harm (Foer 2009).  Food statis-
tics consistently show that in many of the countries in the developed world, a smaller and smaller 
proportion of the disposable income is spent on food (e.g. in 1950 in the US, this figure was 20.6%, 
in 2008 it was down to 9.6% (ERS/USDA, 2009). The cost to produce food as cheaply as possible in 
our industrialised food system translates into modern animal agriculture that is heavily dependent 
upon cheap fossil energy and abundant water, and which produces much waste and contains much 
systemic inefficiency. The real costs to the environment, the climate, animal welfare and human 
health are not visible in the prices of the animal products. These externalised costs are often shoul-
dered by cost cutting-practices that come at the expense of animal welfare, human health and the 
environment (Ilea 2009). The virtues of attentiveness and competence remind individual consumers 
that the situation cannot stay like this forever, and that modern animal agriculture is unsustainable 
over the long haul and is a major culprit in anthropogenic climate change, as described above.  
 
The virtues of responsibility and responsiveness challenge us to find solutions that can help mitigate 
or adapt to a world in which an increase in human population is looming large, and one in which less 
water and energy and more hunger are certainties. The virtues approach further advocates good hus-
bandry and sustainable farming practices, which minimise animal suffering and our ecological foot-
print through inspiring producers and consumers to strive for competence and responsiveness in hus-
bandry and in consumption patterns. Coupled with innovative thinking, the virtues approach has an 
important role to play in overcoming challenges of both animal welfare and climate change by not 
solely searching for a (quick) technological solution, but rather taking a holistic perspective on the 
human-animal-climate-relationship (Wolf and Gjerris, 2009).   
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In sum, a virtues approach could revitalise the relationship between humans and animals by creating 
an opportunity to enter into meaningful relationships built on attentiveness and responsibility, and 
could transform the perception of farm animals from strange unspeaking commodities to communi-
cative vivid individuals who deserve our moral attention. More importantly, it allows for a compre-
hensive view of our responsibilities to the environment and to animals, both 'resources' from which 
we benefit. The tendency under the more traditional 'humane moralism' which tends to pit citizens 
against each other as separate stakeholders can also be circumscribed. A virtues approach helps us 
see that it is a single canvas on which our moral obligations are expressed. Hence, a virtues approach 
can help facilitate the necessary changes in lifestyle that would lead to a reduced ecological impact 
on the planet. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The global climate is changing. We face a situation in which more humans will have to be fed on 
less arable land under more difficult climatic conditions. Part of the problem is the emissions of 
greenhouse gases from animal production. Around 15% stems from the production of meat and relat-
ed products. Animal production thus carries a significant responsibility for anthropogenic climate 
change. At the same time we face a growing number of animal welfare problems due to the ever 
increasing hunt for more efficient production methods. Therefore, it seems necessary to rethink our 
relationship with animals in relation to food production and climate change.  
 
Here we have highlighted two different strategies to adapt to and mitigate climate change. The first 
implies increasing the efficiency of the production systems through feed improvement, intensified 
production systems, inclusion of biotechnological tools in breeding strategies, such as genetic modi-
fication and cloning etc., while at the same time focusing on the animal species with the lowest 
greenhouse gas emissions, such as fish in aquaculture and broilers. In theory, this can be done in a 
way that, at the same time, includes the consideration of animal welfare, although experience tells us 
that intensified production usually evolves at the expense of the animals. Thus, both from an anthro-
pocentric viewpoint, whereby only human interests count, and to some extent from a utilitarian point 
of view, this strategy is tempting, since it fulfils the human desire for the consumption of meat and 
other animal products, whilst it can at the same time be ethically justified. However, other ethical 
perspectives, such as animal rights ethics and adherents of what has been labelled “respect for na-
ture”, find this strategy more problematic as it increases the already widespread instrumentalisation 
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of animals, violates their integrity and continues a perceived movement from “natural” to “unnatu-
ral” in the way animals are kept for agricultural purposes. 
 
The second strategy focuses on framing the agricultural animal production system within a broad 
notion of sustainability including both environmental, animal welfare, socio-economic and cultural 
issues. Here the idea that animal husbandry is a personal relationship between the farmer and ani-
mals, which are treated with respect in relation to their species-specific behaviour, is central. From 
this point of view, the idea is not to change nature as much as possible to accommodate human de-
sires for animal products, but to change cultural and personal habits to some extent to respect both 
animals, and to mitigate the impact of animal production on climate change. This strategy would 
imply a reduction in the consumption of animal products, but would not require the adoption of a 
vegetarian or vegan diet.  
 
Finally, we suggest that a way of looking at the combined problem of animal production and climate 
change is to expand the classical individualistic traditions of utilitarianism and deontology with a 
virtues based approach to the relationship between humans and animals as it changes under the 
threatening shadow of climate change. We suggest looking at the issue through the perspectives of 
the concepts: Attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness. This facilitates a change 
in the relationship between producers, consumers and the animals in the farming systems towards a 
more inclusive relationship, whereby the responsibility of the consumer both for the welfare of the 
animals that he or she chooses to consume and the impact on climate change, becomes more appar-
ent. Through the focus on virtues and the virtuous person, the change in the relationship between 
humans and animals, and the necessary changes in dietary habits, can be understood as an opportuni-
ty for humans to enter into a more meaningful relationship with animals and nature, instead of as a 
necessary sacrifice that must be carried out to the detriment of the quality of life, as it is often seen 
today. Mitigating climate change through changes in dietary habits towards less meat from animals 
with higher welfare would thus be seen as a choice supporting visions of what the good human (and 
animal) life is. 
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